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Abstract
In retirement a pensioner must often decide how much money to withdraw
from a pension fund, how to invest the remaining funds, and whether to pur-
chase an annuity. These decisions are addressed here by introducing a number
of income drawdown schemes, which are relevant to a defined-contribution per-
sonal pension plan. The optimal asset allocation is defined so that it minimises
the expected loss of the pensioner as measured by the performance of the pen-
sion fund against a benchmark. Two benchmarks are considered: a risk-free
investment and the price of an annuity. The fair-value income drawdown rate
is defined so that the fund performance is a martingale under the objective
measure. Annuitisation is recommended if the expected fair-value drawdown
rate falls below the annuity rate available at retirement. As an illustration, the
annuitisation age is calculated for a Gompertz mortality distribution function
and a power law loss function.
1 Introduction
A defined-contribution (DC) pension scheme provides an income for a pensioner
after retirement from a fund built-up from investing a series of contributions during
their period of employment. The financial risk is taken by the member of the scheme
since the fund is associated with an individual and there is no guarantee of a fixed
benefit level at retirement. The pension scheme is split into two phases. During the
accumulation (or pre-retirement) phase, the scheme member and/or their employer
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contribute to the pension fund, which is invested in a portfolio of assets with a
particular risk profile. In the distribution (or post-retirement) phase the pensioner
receives periodic income from the fund in order to provide support in old age. There
are a number of mechanisms operating in different countries for distributing the
pension fund (Lunnon, 2002).
In some countries, the retirement income is provided by an annuity, which (ac-
cording to regulations) must be bought at retirement and provides an income for
the lifetime of the pensioner. In the U.S. there is no such requirement, and an
individual can choose whether to withdraw from the DC pension fund subject to
certain restrictions. For example, in the 401(k) DC pension plan the pensioner must
begin to withdraw the Required Minimum Distribution (RMD) from the fund by
the age of 70.5. In the U.K. the pensioner has the option to defer the purchase of the
annuity, and instead receive income direct from the pension fund. This is called the
income drawdown option. However, irrespective of the details of distribution phase
of a particular DC plan, the pensioner faces the problem of how much money to
withdraw in retirement, how to invest the remaining funds and whether to purchase
an annuity. These are the problems that we address here.
There is a growing literature on investment decisions in the accumulation phase
of the DC pension scheme (Blake et al., 2001, and cited references). There is less
literature on the distribution phase and the income drawdown option (Milevsky,
1998; Lunnon, 2002; Blake et al., 2003; Gerrard et al., 2004a,b, 2006).
Milevsky (1998) finds the optimal time to annuitise based on a deterministic
model, and a more sophisticated stochastic model incorporating stochastic interest
rate, asset and mortality models. For the deterministic model, the optimal time to
annuitise is when the fund is unable to provide an income stream comparable to an
annuity. For the stochastic model, Milevsky finds the probability that the attainable
consumption is greater than the initial consumption. If one sets a threshold for this
probability, then one can determine the optimal time to annuitise. Milevsky &
Robinson (2000) fix the income drawdown rate and invest the fund in a single risky
asset. They find the eventual probability of ruin, and find an approximation in order
to determine if ruin occurs before the time of death, that is the pensioner outlives his
or her funds. The option to defer the purchase of an annuity can also be considered
as a real option (Milevsky & Young, 2002), and its value is the loss of utility arising
from being unable to behave optimally.
Gerrard et al. (2004b) determine the optimal asset allocation for a fixed income
drawdown rate which minimises a quadratic loss function. Using the loss func-
tion they specify a target wealth over the drawdown period in order that a more
favourable annuity can be purchased at the time of compulsory annuitisation. Con-
sequently, they find that the optimal stock allocation decreases with time for an
exponential target function and the distribution of the final annuity rate is simi-
lar to a lognormal distribution. In a follow-up paper, Gerrard et al. (2004a) use a
target drawdown rate based on a quadratic loss function and find that the optimal
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amount invested in the risky asset decreases with time. The expected consumption
is constant over time and they find that introducing mortality risk and a bequest
function does not significantly alter the optimal controls. Finally, Gerrard et al.
(2006) combine both formulations and consider a loss function which is a weighted
sum of a target wealth profile and a target drawdown rate. Numerical simulations
generally show a decreasing optimal asset allocation and an increasing optimal draw-
down rate, although the results do depend sensitively on the weighting used in the
loss function.
This work is complementary to Gerrard et al. (2004a,b, 2006), but rather than
specify a target for the pensioner, we focus on the asset allocation which minimises
the shortfall in the pension fund since the pension may be a significant proportion
of income post-retirement. Income drawdown is normative and it is formulated in
terms of the performance of the pension fund relative to a benchmark. These schemes
describe a form of self-annuitisation where the pensioner takes on investment risk
whilst tracking a benchmark fund.
The paper is organised as follows. In the following section, we introduce the
model of income drawdown ignoring mortality risk. We formulate the problem as an
optimal control problem in Section 3. In Section 4, we categorise the loss functions
which lead to a separable solution of the HJB equation. Mortality risk is introduced
in Section 5, while Section 6 contains conclusions and suggestions for further work.
2 Model
Suppose that the pension fund is of size X(s) at the time of retirement s. If the
pensioner buys a level annuity immediately then s/he receives a constant cash flow
bs per unit time for life. Alternatively, we suppose that the pensioner can defer the
purchase of an annuity, and invest the fund X(s) in a single riskless asset, which
provides a rate of return r. In order to provide a comparable cash flow to the annuity
the pensioner withdraws bs per unit time until time T , at which point we assume
that the pensioner is required to purchase an annuity with the remainder of the
fund. We ignore any consideration of the effect of mortality at this stage.
If the size of the fund is F (t) at time t then the fund evolves according to
dF
dt
= rF − bs, (1)
as in Gerrard et al. (2004b) who consider the same equation with a terminal bound-
ary condition since they pose F (t) as a natural target for the pensioner. Our inter-
pretation follows Milevsky (1998) and so we integrate (1) and apply the boundary
condition F (s) = X(s) to obtain
F (t) =
bs
r
+
(
X(s)−
bs
r
)
er(t−s). (2)
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We call F (t) the benchmark fund: it is the size of the pension fund if the pen-
sioner makes a riskless investment with return r at time s and subsequently with-
draws income at a constant rate bs. If bs < rX(s) then the fund grows exponentially
and the pension fund always outperforms an annuity. Normally the annuity rate bs
is set so that this condition is not satisfied. If bs > rX(s) then there is a time t
∗ at
which F (t∗) = 0 and the fund is exhausted. We shall assume t∗ > T since otherwise
the annuity is preferable to income drawdown. Note that we refer to the fund by its
value at time t for the sake of brevity.
Suppose now a proportion y(t) of the pension fund is invested in a risky asset
at time t > s whilst the remainder is invested in a riskless asset. If the price of the
risky asset is lognormally distributed with constant drift λ and constant volatility
σ then the change in the value of the fund is
dX(t) = [X(t)(y(t)(λ− r) + r)− b(t,X(t))] dt+X(t)y(t)σ dW (t), (3)
where b(t,X(t)) is the income drawdown rate, which can depend on time and the
current state of the fund.
We define the performance of the pension fund X(t) relative to the benchmark
fund F (t) by
Z(t) =
X(t)
F (t)
, (4)
so that Z(s) = 1. The relative performance Z is a non-dimensional quantity, which
measures the benefit of placing some of the fund in a stock rather than solely in a
risk-free asset.
We measure the pensioner’s aversion to shortfall by introducing a loss function
L(t, Z(t)) (Cairns, 2000; Gerrard et al., 2004b; Boulier et al., 1995) with some basic
properties. Boulier et al. (1995) and Cairns (2000) use a loss function which is a
function of the pensioner’s consumption since they consider the accumulation phase
of a DC pension scheme. We use the loss function as a way to express the risk
preferences of the pensioner during the income drawdown phase so that it is similar
to a utility function (Pratt, 1964). We restrict the domain of L to Z ≥ 0 and if
Z = 0 then the pension fund is empty, which leads to a substantial loss, so that
we require L(t, 0) > 0. We also require that ∂L/∂Z < 0 so that the loss function
strictly decreases with increasing fund performance. We note that the loss function
measures performance preferences as first suggested by Markowitz (1952). We shall
study loss functions which are asymmetric about Z = 1 in order to exaggerate a
shortfall in the pension fund Z < 1 in comparison to a surplus Z > 1.
In order to determine the optimal asset allocation y(t) for the pensioner (or the
company operating the pension scheme) we minimise the expected total discounted
loss over the planning horizon:
Es,x
[∫ T
s
e−ρ(u−s)L(u, Z(u)) du+ ǫe−ρ(T−s)L(T, Z(T ))
]
, (5)
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where the subjective discount is ρ and ǫ measures the value of any terminal cost
at compulsory retirement. Gerrard et al. (2004b) use a similar objective in their
analysis. It is clear from the form of this objective that the optimal strategy is
unaffected by the addition of a constant to the loss function. Consequently we write
L(t, Z(t)) = L0 + L(t, Z(t)), (6)
where L0 is chosen so that there is no loss if the current pension fund is equal to the
benchmark fund i.e. L = 0 at Z = 1. Henceforth, we focus on the loss function L.
3 Optimisation
We use stochastic optimal control theory in order to solve this problem. Define the
value function
V (t, x) := min
y
Et,x
[∫ T
t
e−ρ(u−s)L(u, Z(u)) du+ ǫe−ρ(T−s)L(T, Z(T ))
]
. (7)
If V is sufficiently smooth then it satisfies the HJB equation
Vt +min
y
{(x(y(λ− r) + r)− b(t, x))Vx +
1
2
(xyσ)2Vxx}+ e
−ρ(t−s)L(t, z) = 0, (8)
with terminal boundary condition
V (T,X(T )) = ǫe−ρ(T−s)L(T, Z(T )). (9)
The first order condition for the HJB equation is
y = −
βVx
σxVxx
, (10)
where the Sharpe ratio is
β =
λ− r
σ
. (11)
The second order condition for a local minimum is Vxx > 0.
Substituting (10) back into the HJB equation (8) yields
Vt + (rx− b(t, x))Vx −
1
2
β2
V 2x
Vxx
+ e−ρ(t−s)L(t, z) = 0. (12)
The presence of the advective term (rx − b(t, x))Vx makes it difficult to postulate
a form for the value function V even if we were to adopt a particular form for the
loss function L(t, z). If r = 0 and b = b(t) then it is natural to look at exponential
loss functions, while if b is proportional to x then power functions yield analytical
solutions. However, in general, the value function depends on x and t and must
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be calculated numerically: it is then much more difficult to apply the verification
theorems of stochastic optimal control theory (Fleming & Rishel, 1975). Instead,
we consider the relative performance of the fund since this seems a more suitable
state variable for a pensioner.
Consequently, we restrict attention to loss functions which are functions solely
of the pension fund performance L = L(z) and rewrite the HJB equation so that
V = V (t, z). Under this coordinate transformation
Vt → Vt −
zVz
F
dF
dt
, Vx →
Vz
F
, Vxx →
Vzz
F 2
, (13)
and the HJB equation (12) becomes
Vt + (bsz − b(t, z))
Vz
F
− 1
2
β2
V 2z
Vzz
+ e−ρ(t−s)L(z) = 0, (14)
using the definition of the benchmark fund (1). It is easy to calculate the evolution
of the performance of the fund for a given asset allocation strategy y:
dZ =
dX
F
−
X(rF − bs)
F 2
dt = yZ((λ− r) dt+ σ dW (t)) +
(bsZ − b(t, Z))
F
dt. (15)
The classical Merton approach (Merton, 1990) to the lifetime investment problem
involves two controls: the asset allocation y and the consumption rate b. The optimal
consumption rate b∗ is derived by balancing the consumption stream with the total
utility derived from that consumption. We do not adopt that approach here because
it seems inappropriate for the income drawdown phase of a pension scheme. The
pension scheme exists to provide an adequate income for the pensioner in old age.
With that aim in mind, there are often restrictions on the form of drawdown in order
that sufficient funds are likely to exist for the pensioner to purchase an annuity
at a future date. But these restrictions are of an ad-hoc form without any firm
theoretical foundation. Our consumption rate is not optimal because it is not part
of an optimisation problem. However, it is not clear how one measures the “social
utility” of maintaining an adequate level of income post-retirement, since it is not
just the individual pensioner who benefits from having a pension.
The formulation that we describe here has some parallels with prospect theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Kahneman & Tversky (1979) describe an alternative
to utility maximisation which incorporates the idea of relative value rather than ab-
solute wealth. This is analogous to our performance process Z and the loss function
L, which measures the risk preferences of a pensioner with reference to a benchmark.
They describe an asymmetric loss function that exaggerates a shortfall in relation to
a gain just as here. The certainty effect observed in the experiments of Kahneman
& Tversky (1979) describes how people overweight outcomes that are considered
certain. The benchmark in this section is the deterministic risk free fund, a fund
that is known with certainty provided that interest rates are deterministic. Thus,
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we measure losses or gains with respect to outcomes that are known with certainty.
In Section 5, we modify the theory in order to incorporate another deterministic
fund which measures mortality risk.
Sen (1997) describes many problems where the objective of maximising the ex-
pected total utility of consumption is violated, and some of the examples which he
cites hinge upon the difficulty of defining a utility function for all possible outcomes
rather than those that just increase some measure of consumption or wealth. The
act of choice is dependent on the identity of the chooser (in our context this is
a pensioner) and the range of alternatives on offer. A pensioner is concerned by
longevity risk and bequest motives in addition to the maximisation of consumption,
and the alternatives on offer in retirement vary from country to country. The choice
of income drawdown is strongly influenced by government legislation. Consequently,
rather than describe a comprehensive set of outcomes, the utility of consumption of a
pensioner, and the set of constraints imposed by government, we adopt a normative
model.
3.1 Performance based income drawdown
Both (14) and (15) suggest that we link the amount that the pensioner can withdraw
per unit time to the performance of the fund. Thus, we suppose that
b(t, Z) = bsZ, (16)
that is the pensioner can withdraw at a rate greater/less than bs when the fund is
performing above/below the benchmark. This scheme is similar to that proposed by
Gerrard et al. (2006) in the sense that they found that it is optimal to withdraw at
a rate that is proportional to the size of the pension fund. However, Gerrard et al.
(2006) determine the withdrawal rate as part of a linear–quadratic optimisation
problem whereas here we specify the drawdown scheme explicitly.
We look for a separable solution of (14) by writing
V (t, z) = e−ρ(t−s)G(t)L(z), (17)
If such a solution can be found then the optimal asset allocation is from (4) and (10)
y∗ = −
βL′
σzL′′
, (18)
and it is independent of G. In general, the optimal strategy depends only on the
form of the loss function, the dimensionless risk of the stock
η :=
β
σ
=
λ− r
σ2
, (19)
(Emms & Haberman, 2007) and the current performance of the fund z.
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If we substitute the optimal asset allocation back into the state equation (15) we
find
dZ = −
L′
L′′
(
β2 dt+ β dW (t)
)
. (20)
Now under the risk-neutral measure (Bjo¨rk, 1998), the Brownian motion becomes
dW˜ (t) = dW (t) + β dt, (21)
where β is the Sharpe ratio, or the market price of risk. Consequently,
dZ = −
βL′
L′′
dW˜ (t),
so that both b(t, Z) and Z are local martingales under the risk-neutral measure. In
fact, they are both martingales under this measure since the form of the loss function
is restricted as we see next.
Substituting (17) into (14) we obtain
G′ − ρG+ 1
G
= 1
2
β2
L′2
LL′′
, (22)
where ′ denotes the relevant derivative. Since the LHS is a function of t and the
RHS is a function of z we must have
L′2
LL′′
= A = const., (23)
and we can integrate and apply the boundary condition G(T ) = ǫ to find
G(t) =
1
ρ+ 1
2
Aβ2
+
(
ǫ−
1
ρ+ 1
2
Aβ2
)
e(ρ+
1
2
Aβ2)(t−T ) ≥ 0. (24)
We can interpret G(t) as the relative expected loss from not annuitising at time t
using the optimal asset allocation strategy since
G(t) =
V
e−ρ(t−s)L(Z(t))
= min
y
Et,z
[∫ T
t
e−ρ(u−t)
L(Z(u))
L(Z(t))
du+ ǫe−ρ(T−t)
L(Z(T ))
L(Z(t))
]
.
(25)
Equation (23) can be rewritten
dL′
dL
=
L′
AL
, (26)
since there is no solution corresponding to A = 0. If A = 1 then integrating
with respect to L followed by z gives L(z) = Be−αz where α, B are constants of
integration. If A 6= 1 then integrating twice again gives
L(z) =
(
Cz +D
γ
)γ
, (27)
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where C, D are constants of integration and we have set
γ =
A
A− 1
6= 0. (28)
If A = 1 then α,B > 0 because the loss function decreases with the fund perfor-
mance and must be strictly convex. Without loss of generality we set B = 1 since
this does not change the optimal asset allocation or the optimal state trajectory. If
A 6= 1 then we require the loss function to decrease with performance and yield a
minimum in the HJB equation:
L′ = C
(
Cz +D
γ
)γ−1
< 0, L′′ =
C2(γ − 1)
γ
(
Cz +D
γ
)γ−2
> 0. (29)
In addition, we specify a positive loss if the pension fund is empty (z = 0) which
means D/γ > 0 assuming that we take the positive root if required. Consequently,
there are two cases: either D, γ < 0 or D, γ > 0. If γ < 0 then we set C = γ
without loss of generality and a = D/γ. Therefore L′ = γ(z + a)γ−1 < 0 and
L′′ = γ(γ − 1)(z + a)γ−2>0. If γ > 0 then we set C = −γ, c = D/γ > 0. Both
conditions in (29) are satisfied if γ > 1 and z < c, which places a restriction on the
domain of the loss function.
3.2 Fair-value income drawdown
The performance based rule given by (16) yields a fund performance that is a martin-
gale under the risk-neutral measure. However, there is no replicating portfolio when
mortality risk is present, and this is certainly present in the distribution phase of a
pension scheme. Consequently, we define the fair-value income drawdown such that
the performance of the pension fund is a martingale under the objective measure.
For the value function to be tractable we look for separable solutions of the form
(17) and substitute into (14):
G′ − ρG+ 1
G
= 1
2
β2
L
′2
L′′L
− (bsz − b(t, z))
L′
FL
. (30)
If income drawdown is of the form
b(t, Z) = bsZ + φ(Z)F (t), (31)
then the LHS of (30) is a function of t and the RHS of (30) is a function of z.
Consequently we can write
G′ − ρG+ 1
G
= 1
2
β2
L
′2
L′′L
+
φL′
L
= 1
2
β2K, (32)
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where K is a constant. Since the value function is separable, the optimal asset
allocation is given by (18) and from (15) we set
φ(Z) = −
β2L′
L′′
, (33)
so that Z is a martingale under the objective measure. The function φ(Z) is positive
provided the loss function is convex. Thus, there is an additional drawdown over
(16), and the exact drawdown rule depends on the loss function. Substituting this
expression back into (32) yields
L′2
L′′L
= −K, (34)
which restricts the form of loss function so that there are separable solutions of the
HJB equation. The analysis now follows (23) with A replaced by −K. Thus the loss
functions for the performance-based drawdown (16) and fair-value drawdown (31)
which yield separable value functions are of the same form.
4 Loss functions
In summary, the optimal strategy, the optimal state trajectory and the distribution
of the pension fund at time T are strongly dependent on the form of the loss function.
The three loss functions which satisfy (23) and (34) can be written in canonical form
and are the exponential or power functions of the first and second kind respectively:
L(z) = e−αz, (z + a)γ, (c− z)n+1, (35)
where α > 0 is the constant risk aversion, γ < 0 and n > 0 since we want the loss to
decrease with z. In addition, a ≥ 0, c > 0 in order that the loss is positive at z = 0,
and a = 0 leads to infinite loss should the pension fund reach Xt = 0.
If L is exponential then A = 1, while if L is of power form then
A =
γ
γ − 1
or A =
n+ 1
n
. (36)
The form of the three loss functions is shown in Figure 1 with L0 chosen so that
L = 0 at z = 1 in each case.
In the following three sections we describe the optimal asset allocation and the
corresponding fund performance for each of the canonical loss functions using per-
formance based income drawdown (16) and the fair-value income drawdown (31). In
all three cases the optimal asset allocation is the same for both drawdown schemes.
For (16) the drift of the fund performance is positive so that the expected fund size
is greater than the case that no risky investment is made, whereas for (31) the fund
performance is a martingale under the objective measure.
10
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Figure 1: Comparison of the canonical loss functions L(z) based on the performance
of the pension fund z with L0 set so that L(1) = 0. Here we have set a = 0.1,
c = 1.5, γ = −0.5, n = 3 and the power loss function of the second kind is only
valid for z < c.
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4.1 Exponential
If the loss function is exponential then from (18)
y∗ =
η
αz
, (37)
so that the distribution of y∗ ∼ 1/Z. A risky stock has η ≪ 1 and so the optimal
asset allocation is small if the fund performs similarly to the benchmark fund z ∼ 1.
If the fund is performing much better than the benchmark fund z ≫ 1 and it is
optimal to invest a small amount in the stock, and a relatively large withdrawal bsz
is permitted. The investment in the risky asset decreases as the risk aversion of the
pensioner α increases.
From (15) the performance of the fund evolves according to
dZ =
1
α
(
β2 dt+ β dW (t)
)
, (38)
using performance based drawdown (16). On an optimal state trajectory Z is nor-
mally distributed with positive mean 1 + β2(t − s)/α and variance β2(t − s)/α2.
Therefore the distribution of the optimal asset allocation has infinite moments for
t > s. In addition, the fund can go bankrupt before the compulsory purchase of an
annuity at time T .
Let us go through the steps in Section 3.2 and derive the optimal control and
state trajectory using fair-value income drawdown for this loss function. From (31)
and (33) the fair-value income drawdown is
b(t, Z) = bsZ +
β2
α
F (t) (39)
per unit time, where β2F (t)/α is the additional risk premium. The HJB equation
(14) then becomes
Vt −
β2
α
Vz −
1
2
β2
V 2z
Vzz
+ e−ρ(t−s)−αz = 0. (40)
and we can find a separable solution of the form V = G(t)e−ρ(t−s)−αz where now the
expected relative loss is
G(t) =
1
ρ− 1
2
β2
+
(
ǫ−
1
ρ− 1
2
β2
)
e(ρ−
1
2
β2)(t−T ), (41)
which is just (24) with K = −A = 1. The optimal asset allocation strategy is given
by (37) while the optimal state trajectory is
dZ =
β
α
dW (t), (42)
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using (15). Consequently, Z is a martingale under the objective measure, and on
average, the fund will maintain its value with reference to the benchmark fund up
until the time T when it is compulsory to purchase an annuity. Notice that income
drawdown b(t, Z) is not a martingale under the objective measure.
Using the normal density function, it is easy to determine the probability of ruin
P[Z(T ) < 0] or the probability that there is a shortfall in the fund relative to the
benchmark at time T : P[Z(T ) < 1].
4.2 Power function of first kind
If the loss function is a power function of the first kind then
y∗ =
η
1− γ
(
1 +
a
z
)
, (43)
and the optimal performance state trajectory for drawdown scheme (16) is
dZ =
(
Z + a
1− γ
)
(β2 dt+ β dW (t)). (44)
If a = 0 the optimal asset allocation is constant, that is independent of the current
performance of the fund, while the performance of the fund is lognormally distributed
with mean eβ
2(t−s)/(1−γ) and variance e2β
2(t−s)/(1−γ)
(
eβ
2(t−s)/(1−γ)2 − 1
)
.
This result is consistent with that in Gerrard et al. (2004b) where a constant
mean asset allocation strategy was observed as being optimal for the natural target
function. This loss function is appropriate for a pensioner who wishes to avoid
outliving their available funds since Z > 0, providing that X(s) > 0, i.e. there
is a positive amount in the fund at retirement. The probability that there is a
shortfall compared to a deterministic fund P[Z(T ) < 1] is easily calculated using the
lognormal density function.
If a > 0 then the asset allocation decreases with the increasing performance of the
fund as in the exponential case (Section 4.1), while Z+a is lognormally distributed.
The fair-value income drawdown scheme for this loss function is
b(t, Z) =
(
bs +
β2F
1− γ
)
Z +
aβ2F
1− γ
, (45)
since then
dZ =
(
Z + a
1− γ
)
β dW (t), (46)
and the optimal asset allocation is given by (43). Notice that for this scheme, the
income drawdown is bounded from below by Z = −a.
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4.3 Power function of second kind
If the loss function is a power function of the second kind then the optimal asset
allocation is
y∗ =
η
n
(
c− z
z
)
, (47)
so that the allocation is positive only if 0 < z < c. If this is the case then the second
order condition is satisfied. The optimal state trajectory for drawdown scheme (16)
is
dZ =
(
c− Z
n
)
(β2 dt+ β dW (t)), (48)
so that c− Z is lognormally distributed.
In fact we can think of Z(t) = c as a performance target for the pensioner since
this is the value which minimises the loss function over its convex part (see Figure 1).
The convexity ensures that the first order condition does yield a minimum in the
Bellman equation. As in Gerrard et al. (2004b) the target is never attained since
Z(s) = 1 by definition. Furthermore, the distribution of the final annuity is given
by X(T ) = F (T )Z(T ), where c− Z(T ) is lognormally distributed, and so the final
annuity is comparable with the plots in Figure 6 of their paper, even though the loss
function is asymmetric about Z = 1.
The fair-value income drawdown scheme is
b(t, Z) =
(
bs −
β2F
n
)
Z +
cβ2F
n
≤ bsc. (49)
and under this drawdown the optimal asset allocation is still given by (47). Income
drawdown is bounded by bsc for this loss function for both the performance-based
and fair-value schemes since Z < c. If Z < 0 then the pensioner may be forced to
contribute to the pension fund in retirement in order to maintain the value of the
final annuity at time T .
5 Mortality risk
The price of an annuity paying continuously a rate of one currency unit per annum
for a pensioner of age t is
a(t) = (1 + θ(t))
∫
∞
0
e−ru upt du, (50)
where θ(t) is the annuity loading and upt is the probability that a pensioner of age
t survives to age t + u. The change in the price of an annuity as the age of the
pensioner changes is given by
da
dt
=
a
1 + θ
dθ
dt
+ (1 + θ)
∫
∞
0
e−ru
d upt
dt
du. (51)
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Following Booth et al. (1998), the conditional probability of survival upt is related
to the force of mortality µ(t) by upt = exp
[
−
∫ t+u
t
µ(τ) dτ
]
so that
d upt
dt
= upt(µ(t)− µ(t+ u)), (52)
which is negative if the force of mortality increases with age. Consequently, the
price of an annuity decreases with age if the change in loading is sufficiently small.
Substituting (52) into (51), using
d upt
du
= −uptµ(t+ u), (53)
and then integrating by parts yields
da
dt
=
(
µ+ r +
1
1 + θ
dθ
dt
)
a− (1 + θ). (54)
This expression is given in Bowers et al. (1986) without the loading factor: the an-
nuity price increases with age at a rate proportional to sum of the force of mortality,
interest rate and change in loading, and decreases at a rate proportional to the cost
of the payout.
We now develop the model by using the price of an annuity paying continuously
at rate bs as the benchmark fund. Thus, we set F (t) = bsa(t) with the initial annuity
bs = X(s)/a(s) so that the benchmark fund varies according to
dF
dt
=
(
µ+ r +
1
1 + θ
dθ
dt
)
F − (1 + θ)bs, (55)
with initial condition F (s) = X(s) by construction. If the force of mortality µ = 0
and the loading θ = 0 then this is the same equation as (1). Thus, we incorporate
the mortality risk in the objective by considering the price of an annuity. We define
the performance of the pension fund relative to the price of the annuity:
Z(t) =
X(t)
F (t)
. (56)
Let us define the value function by
V (t, x) := min
y
Et,x
[∫ T∧TD
t
e−ρ(u−s)L(u, Z(u)) du+ ǫe−ρ(T−s)L(T, Z(T ))1TD>T
]
,
(57)
where TD is the random time of death. Following Gerrard et al. (2006), the corre-
sponding Bellman equation takes the form
Vt+min
y
{(x(y(λ−r)+r)−b(t, x))Vx+
1
2
(xyσ)2Vxx}−δ(t)V +e
−ρ(t−s)L(t, z) = 0, (58)
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if we assume that there is no bequest motive, the drawdown rate is b(t, x), and the
subjective force of mortality is δ(t)1. The terminal boundary condition is
V (T, x) = ǫe−ρ(T−s)L(T, Z(T )). (59)
The first order condition is given by (10), which on substitution into (58), using
the coordinate transformation (13) and adopting a loss function L = L(z) yields
Vt +
Vz
F
(
z
(
bs(1 + θ(t))− µ(t)F (t)−
F (t)
1 + θ(t)
dθ
dt
)
− b(t, z)
)
−
1
2
β2
V 2z
Vzz
− δ(t)V + e−ρ(t−s)L(z) = 0. (60)
The form of the advective term in this equation suggests we adopt the drawdown
process
b(t, Z) =
(
bs (1 + θ(t))− µ(t)F (t)−
F (t)
1 + θ(t)
dθ
dt
)
Z(t), (61)
for then we can find three forms of separable solution as before using
V = e−ρ(t−s)G(t)L(z), (62)
depending on the form of L(z), given by (35). In addition, the optimal asset alloca-
tion strategy is given by (18), and the performance of the fund is
dZ = yZ((λ− r) dt+ σ dW (t)), (63)
so that the analysis in Section 4 carries through as before. Notice that the subjective
force of mortality δ(t) does not change the optimal asset allocation strategy, but
only appears in the time dependent part G(t) of the value function. It is only the
objective force of mortality µ(t) that affects the income drawdown rate because this
determines the price of an annuity2.
5.1 Annuitisation and the value of deferral
In this section we focus on a power loss function of the first kind L(z) = (z + a)γ
where the optimal asset allocation is given by (43). At retirement Z(T ) + a is
lognormally distributed and the fair-value drawdown process is
b(t, Z) =
(
bs (1 + θ(t)) +
(
β2
1− γ
− µ(t)
)
F (t)−
F (t)
1 + θ(t)
dθ
dt
)
Z(t) +
aβ2F (t)
1− γ
,
(64)
1The objective force of mortality µ(t) is calculated from a life table by an insurance company in
order to price an annuity, whereas the subjective force of mortality δ(t) represents the perception
of the pensioner with regard to their own longevity at age t.
2It easy to show that a logarithmic loss function of the form L(z) = − log φz leads to a value
function of the form V (t, z) = H1(t) +H2(t) log φz. The optimal asset allocation given by (18) is
then constant and so independent of the subjective force of mortality δ(t).
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since then Es [Z(T )] = 1, that is the expected size of the pension fund is sufficient
to buy an annuity which pays bs for the remainder of the pensioner’s life. If the
loading is constant then drawdown can be above or below the initial annuity rate bs
depending on the size of the term µ(t)F (t). We illustrate this point with an example
in the next section for a specific choice for the force of mortality.
If a = 0 and the loading θ is constant then the expected drawdown rate falls
below bs(1 + θ) if µ(t) > β
2/(1− γ), which is similar to the annuitisation condition
given in Milevsky & Young (2002). One should note that γ is a parameter in the
utility function for consumption in their paper, whereas here it is a parameter in the
loss function. However, the interpretation of the condition is the same: the force of
mortality can be thought of as the excess return on the annuity, while β2/(1 − γ)
is the drift in the performance of the fund if the pensioner adopts the drawdown
scheme given by (61).
Let us define
ta = inf{t : s ≤ t ≤ T, Es [b(u, Z(u))] < bs ∀t ≤ u ≤ T}, (65)
with ta = ∞ if the infimum does not exist. We suggest annuitisation at age ta
because the annuity guarantees a greater income stream for the remainder of the
drawdown period. Whether such a ta exists depends on the behaviour of the objec-
tive force of mortality as t→∞. Notice that it is the objective force of mortality, µ,
which affects the annuitisation time rather than the subjective force of mortality δ.
Thus, a strong feature of the model is that the time for annuitisation is independent
of pensioner’s view of their own mortality.
The value at retirement of deferring annuitisation is the expected consumption
increase over the annuity rate:
Vd =Es
∫ ta∧T∧TD
s
e−ρ(u−s)(b(u, Z(u))− bs) du
=
∫ ta∧T
s
e−ρ(u−s)(Es[b(u, Z(u))]− bs) u−sp
S
s du, (66)
where the subjective conditional survival probability is
u−sp
S
s = exp
[
−
∫ u
s
δ(τ) dτ
]
. (67)
In general, this cannot be simplified for given subjective and objective mortality
distributions.
5.2 Example: Gompertz distribution
Let us suppose that the loading θ is constant and the power loss function param-
eter a = 0. If we model the objective mortality using a two-parameter Gompertz
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distribution (Frees et al., 1996) then the conditional survival probability is
upt =
exp
(
e−
m
φ
(
1− e
t+u
φ
))
exp
(
e−
m
φ
(
1− e
t
φ
)) , (68)
where m is the mode and φ is the scale measure. Using this notation the force of
mortality is
µ(t) =
e
t−m
φ
φ
. (69)
Substituting this expression into (50) gives the explicit price for a continuous unit
annuity as
a(t) = (1 + θ)φe(t−m)r exp
(
e
t−m
φ
)
Γ
(
−φr, e
t−m
φ
)
, (70)
where the incomplete Gamma function is defined by Γ(w, x) =
∫
∞
x
e−uuw−1 du.
From (64) the expected fair-value drawdown is
Es [b(t, Z)] = bs
(
1 + θ + a(t)
(
β2
1− γ
− µ(t)
))
. (71)
The expected drawdown rate relative to that provided by the annuity at retirement
is
rd(t) =
Es [b(t, Z)]
bs
=
(1 + θ)
(
1 +
(
φβ2
1− γ
− e
t−m
φ
)
e(t−m)r exp
(
e
t−m
φ
)
Γ
(
−φr, e
t−m
φ
))
, (72)
using (69),(70) and (71).
Next, we choose a suitable parameter set. First suppose that, for the power loss
function, γ = −0.5 . This gives the optimal asset allocation as y∗ = 2
3
η from (43),
which means it is optimal to maintain a constant proportion of wealth in the risky
asset. If η < 3
2
then no borrowing is required, and this condition is satisfied for a
sufficiently risky stock. For example, if λ = 0.08, r = 0.05, σ = 0.2 then y∗ = 0.5
and no borrowing is required.
Frees et al. (1996) use the Gompertz distribution to fit annuity data from a
Canadian insurance company. For male policyholders they found m = 86.4 years
and φ = 9.8 years. If we take r = 0.05, θ = 0.1, s = 60, T = 80 then we can plot
rd(t) as the Sharpe ratio β is varied. The results are shown in Figure 2.
As the riskiness of the stock is increased the pensioner receives greater expected
income drawdown than from an annuity. This also leads to greater variation in
the final annuity. The income rate decreases over the drawdown period in order to
maintain the expected level of the fund at annuitisation. In Figure 2, if β = 0.2 and
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Figure 2: Relative income drawdown rate rd(t) as the Sharpe ratio β is varied using
a Gompertz mortality distribution.
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the pensioner wishes to receive expected income above or at the rate of the initial
annuity then we suggest annuitisation at ta ∼ 78 years.
For this mortality distribution the annuitisation condition (65) becomes
e(t
a
−m)r exp
(
e
ta−m
φ
)
Γ
(
−φr, e
ta−m
φ
)(
e
ta−m
φ −
β2φ
1− γ
)
=
θ
1 + θ
, (73)
and if the loading is θ = 0 then this expression reduces to ta = m+ φ log
(
β2φ
1−γ
)
. If
we suppose that the subjective probabilities are equal to the objective probabilities
used in the annuity pricing, then the value of deferring annuitisation from (66) is
Vd(s) = bs
∫ ta∧T
s
(
θ + e−ρ(u−s)
(
β2
1− γ
− µ(u)
)
a(u)
)
u−sp
S
s du
= bs exp
(
e
s−m
φ
)∫ ta∧T
s
e−r(u−s)×
(
θ exp
(
−e
u−m
φ
)
+ (1 + θ)
(
β2φ
1− γ
− e
u−m
φ
)
er(u−m)Γ(−φr, e
u−m
φ )
)
du. (74)
We plot Vd(s) as β is varied in Figure 3 using the previous parameter set, the annuity
rate of bs = £10,000 per annum, and ρ = r = 0.05. As the Sharpe ratio β increases
the value of deferral increases because a greater expected return can be obtained
from taking greater risk. The variation about Vd can be computed by Monte-Carlo
simulation of the square of the integral in (66).
6 Conclusions and further work
We have proposed an income drawdown scheme (16) which minimises the expected
total loss of performance of the fund over the planning horizon by using the opti-
mal asset allocation. Drawdown is proportional to the fund performance measured
against a given benchmark, and it is independent of the loss function. Moreover,
the expected fund performance increases with time and the rate of expected increase
depends on the riskiness of the stock and the loss function. Thus the pensioner can
tailor their drawdown strategy so that the pension fund yields a given expected re-
turn using an optimal asset allocation strategy. The investment risk taken by the
pensioner can be determined analytically for each of the canonical loss functions
considered in the paper.
In addition, the analysis motivates the fair-value drawdown schemes each of
which depend on the loss function of the pensioner. In these schemes, there is an
additional withdrawal such that the fund performance has zero drift, that is, it is
a martingale. All of the drawdown schemes lead to an income which is greater
than the rate offered by an annuity if the pension fund performs particularly well,
whilst at the same time maintaining (or increasing) the expected fund size so that
20
 0
 20000
 40000
 60000
 80000
 100000
 120000
 0.05  0.1  0.15  0.2  0.25  0.3  0.35  0.4  0.45  0.5
V d
/£
β
Figure 3: The value of deferral of annuitisation at retirement Vd as the Sharpe ratio
β is varied if the annuity rate at retirement is bs = £10,000 per annum.
21
an annuity can be purchased if this is compulsory. Therefore, the schemes allow the
pensioner to benefit from investment performance, provide a measure of security for
government, and release funds to stimulate economic growth.
The fair-value drawdown schemes provide an answer as to how one can determine
the appropriate level of income post-retirement. The merit of the fair-value scheme
is its simplicity and the simple form for the distribution of the final annuity should
annuitisation occur. One might consider the schemes themselves as a benchmark:
if a pensioner withdraws more than the fair-value drawdown rate then they should
expect a smaller final annuity. In addition, if the benchmark is the annuity price
then only the objective mortality rates are used to calculate fair-value drawdown. It
is only the market price of mortality which affects fair-value drawdown rather than
the subjective view of the pensioner.
We have studied two benchmark funds: a risk-free investment and the price
of an annuity. For the second benchmark fund, the fair-value drawdown scheme
fixes income so that the expected fund size allows the purchase of annuity which
provides the same income stream as an annuity bought at retirement. Annuitisation
should occur if and when the force of mortality exceeds a performance threshold.
We have illustrated these results with a Gompertz mortality distribution function.
However, the proposed drawdown schemes would break current U.K. legislation,
which specifies no minimum withdrawal and a maximum withdrawal of 120% of the
retirement annuity rate before age 75. These schemes are a compromise between
a lump sum payment on retirement and immediate compulsory annuitisation. In
the case of a lump sum payment, we provide guidance on how the pensioner might
invest the payment whilst making periodic withdrawals.
More generally we can interpret the benchmark fund F (t) as a target wealth
profile for the pension fund. Suppose the target evolves according to
dF
dt
= H(t, F ), (75)
for a given function H and F (s) = X(s). Both choices for the benchmark fund in
this paper are of this form. If we set the advective term in the HJB equation equal
to zero then
b(t, Z) = (rF (t)−H(t, F (t)))Z(t). (76)
With this choice of drawdown the fund performance evolves according to
dZ =
dX
F
−
XH
F 2
dt = yZ((λ− r) dt+ σ dW (t)). (77)
The optimal asset allocation strategy depends on the three forms of the loss function,
while the fair-value drawdown removes the drift in the above equation. Thus with a
fair-value drawdown scheme and an optimal asset allocation strategy the expected
pension fund size is the target: Es[X(t)] = F (t).
Further research may include generalising the model to incorporate a stochastic
interest rate and a stochastic force of mortality (Milevsky & Promislow, 2001; Biffis,
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2005). If the force of mortality is a stochastic process then the price of an annuity
for a pensioner of age t is also stochastic. Thus, the benchmark process is stochastic
and then the optimisation problem is similar to that studied by Browne (1999).
He considers a variety of objectives related to the fund performance, which may
be appropriate for a pensioner choosing the income drawdown option. The idea of
maintaining the value of the pension fund is also similar to the value preserving
portfolio strategies described by Korn (2000), and this is a further line of research.
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